My son often describes Seattle as the place where baseball talent comes to die. The examples have no end.

Let us review a few, before I attempt a very curt explanation.

Adam Jones, who came up through the Mariners’ farm system, was traded to Baltimore in exchange for George Sherrill and Erick Bedard. Sherrill is back with the M’s, only to injure his arm, which earned him a spot on the disabled list. Bedard, who possesses one of the best curve balls around, pitched little with the Mariners. He, too, spent most of his time recovering from injuries. As for Jones, he is now, of course, a bona fide all-star center fielder. He’s batting around .300 with 13 home runs. The Orioles sit atop the American League eastern division. Jones also sports a gold glove.

Adrian Beltre came and went. But during his five-year stint in Seattle, he gave every indication that his bat had never hit a ball. Swing and a miss, usually on a slider away, far away. The year before he arrived in our fair city, he tore up National League pitching, batting over .330 and leading the league in home runs, with 48. In his first season with Seattle his average plummeted by 80 points and he hit only 19 four-baggers. The best he could do here was .276 in 2007, when he also hit 26 home runs. He was then dealt to Boston where he miraculously discovered his latent abilities, those he had displayed with the Dodgers. In 2010 with the Red Sox he hit .321 and led the league in doubles. Becoming a free agent that year, he signed a huge contract with the Texas Rangers, where he’s batted .300. Last year there he smacked 32 home runs.

The Mariners were just swept by the Cleveland Indians. Their roster includes at least three former Mariners, all position players. They are Shin-Soo Choo, Jack Hannahan, and Jose Lopez, who slammed a three-run homer yesterday to tie the Mariners in a game that M’s closer Brandon League decided to go apeshit in the bottom of the 11th, yielding three BBs, the lead, and eventually the walk-off single that scored the winning run. Lopez could be the exception to the rule. In 2009, he actually hit .297 when he was with Seattle, far above his career average of .262. Choo never hit above .100 with Seattle. After landing in Cleveland, he put up some impressive stats, including three consecutive seasons at .300 or above. He’s the Indians regular right fielder and known for having one of the best arms in baseball. Hannahan played but one year in Seattle, when he hit .230. He’s now hitting .287 with Cleveland.

The Mariners signed David Ortiz, then named David Americo Arias. That was 1992. And how has he done since we let him go? You can see for yourself here. Speaking of the Red Sox, where Ortiz serves as designated hitter, we also used to have Jason Varitek and Derek Lowe. Well the Mariners signed them only to trade them both to Boston in exchange for Heathcliff Slocumb, perhaps the worst trade in baseball history next to that guy Ruth. What’s so odd about Slocumb, other than the fact that he was a bust with the Mariners, is that his ERA was 5.79 in his last year with the Red Sox. What the hell were the Mariners’ brass thinking. Oh, you say they weren’t then and perhaps ever. Got it.

Remember Rafael Soriano? He had an uneven experience with Seattle before he, too, left the team. In 2010, while pitching for Tampa Bay, he led the league in saves, with an ERA of under 1.73. He’s taken over for injured Mariano Rivera as the Yankees’s closer.

The Mariners had a big left-handed pitcher named Matt Thornton. We had no use for him, so he wound up with the Chicago White Sox. His career strikeouts-per-nine-innings ratio is 9.7. In 2010 he struck out 12 batters for every nine innings pitched, recording an ERA of 2.67. Well, the M’s have Charlie Furbush and Lucas Luetge for the same role. Splendid. A couple of thumbers versus a fear-monger.

Let’s talk shortstop for a minute. The Mariners’ front office made a big deal about acquiring Jack Wilson, who was an all-star with the Pirates. He hit .308 one year, when he made the All-Star roster, and almost .300 in another. His fielding was impeccable. But he had a miserable time in Seattle, never hitting above .250. His stint with the M’s may have ruined him for life. He’s now with the Braves batting an anemic .170. To replace him, the Mariners acquired Brendan Ryan. With the Cardinals he managed to hit as high as .292 in 2009, and .287 a couple of years before that. Since he’s become a Mariner, his average dropped to .248 last year and he’s really struggling this season, hitting only .153. He weighs 195 pounds. Only pitchers are allowed to hit below their weight. In 1984 Seattle signed Omar Vizquel. In my opinion, he’s the best shortstop I’ve ever seen. In five years with the Mariners he averaged .250. Since leaving, he’s hit as high as .333 with Cleveland and above .290 in three other seasons. His career BA is .272.

We drafted Raul Ibanez in 1992. Without a doubt he is the M’s best left fielder ever. But not at first. He hit poorly in his initial stint with Seattle, before he wound up in Kansas City. His bat came alive there. He hit .280 the first year with the Royals, then two straight years of .294. The M’s reacquired him, and—guess what?—he defied the curse, recording his best seasons, even hitting .304 in 2004. Yet, spending those last years with Seattle took its toll on Raul’s bat; he’s never done as well since.

The Mariners used to have a guy named Mike Morse. I always liked him. So do the Washington Nationals. After playing sporadically in Seattle, he’s found a home in the Capitol, batting over .300 last year, with 31 home runs. His career BA is .296, and he can play just about anywhere on the field.

We can’t forget that the Mariners traded Cliff Lee (and Mark Lowe) for Justin Smoak, Blake Beavan, and Josh Lueke. Lee is now with the Phillies being Cliff Lee, which is to say, quite well, thank you. He’s also pulling down over $20 million a year. His ERA this year is under 2.0. The Mariners believe(d) that Smoak is their answer at first base. How’s that working out for Seattle? Shitty, I’d say. He’s hitting just .209 as I write, though he got two hits in yesterday’s miserable loss.

One of my favorite pitchers today is Doug Fister. He started out slow, but improved each year with the Mariners. He got so good, in fact, that we traded him. Of course. He’s one of the most dominant pitchers in the American League, with an ERA of 1.79 in 2011 for Detroit, and an even lower ERA this year. And who did we get in return? Can you say Casper Wells and Charlie Furbush? Wells hit above .300 in his first year with Detroit and .257 when we acquired him. With Seattle, however, he’s hit a consistent .216. Furbush’s ERA when we traded for him was 3.62. After reaching Seattle his ERA jumped to 6.62. This year it’s 4.30 in limited action.

But we can’t forget Chone Figgins. A lifetime .290 hitter, his talent really died in Seattle, with no hint of improvement on the horizon. While with the Angels, his lowest season average was .267, ignoring his rookie year, when he had only a dozen plate appearances. In 2005 he led the American League in stolen bases with 65. In his three seasons with Seattle he’s stolen a total of 48. As for his batting average, what can we say? His averages: .257, .188, and this year .182.

Seattle hasn’t always been talent’s black hole. In 2001 the team tied the major league record for most victories: 116. The entire team average was .288. Four of the nine roster regulars hit over .300. Ichiro led with .350 and Bret Boone his .331. Four batters had at least 20 home runs, with Boone heading the list with 37. The pitching staff had a collective ERA of 3.54. Jamie Moyer won 20 games and Freddie Garcia collected 18 wins. The team scored exactly 300 more runs than their opponents.

Ah, the good old days. That year the opening day payroll was $75.7 million, or the 11th highest in the league. The Yankees, as always, were number one, with a payroll of $110 million. This year the M’s opened with a combined payroll of $82 million, just an eight percent increase over 12 seasons; and the Mariners have fallen to 18th place, far below the Yankees ($198 million) and the Phillies ($175 million). So, the Yankees boosted their payroll over the same period by 80 percent, or 10 times more than Seattle. Does money buy pennants?

There are four teams with a lower payroll than the Mariners who are either leading their divisions, tied, or within a game. These are Tampa Bay, with a payroll of $64 million, the Baltimore Orioles ($81 million), the Cleveland Indians ($78 million), and the Washington Nationals ($81 million). It would seem, then, that money doesn’t buy you love—or necessarily a trophy.

So I’ll suggest two explanations for the Mariners’ woes. The first is the general manager, the person responsible for putting talent on the field. The second is the manager, the one who has to get that talent to perform. If I were grading their respective efforts, an ‘F’ gets recorded next to their names.

The question on the minds of every San Francisco Giants fan is What the hell is wrong with Lincecum? Last night he took to the mound, threw some decent pitches, struck out several of the opposition, only to yield a string of base hits resulting in another loss. His line:

A key metric for pitchers is walks plus hits per inning. This season Lincecum’s number is 1.56. Over his career he’s averaged 1.2 WHIP. In his Cy Young seasons, Lincecum recorded 1.17 and and 1.05 WHIP, for the years 2008 and 2009, respectively. In the year he won the award, Felix Hernandez gave up an average of 1.06 walks-plus-hits per inning.

Masterful (Greg) Maddux walked an average of 0.20 batters per inning over 23 years. His career WHIP was 1.14.

I know, it’s unfair to compare Lincecum with Maddux. Heck, this year it may be unfair to compare Lincecum with the Mariners’ Kevin Millwood; his WHIP this year is 1.6, and he has a lower ERA for 2012.

Notwithstanding the unfairness of it all, it may be edifying to wonder what made Maddux so successful and Lincecum a bust this year. As a former pitcher (Cal) I appreciate the importance of mechanics in delivering the ball to particular targets, accommodating different velocities and ball-rotations. Maddux had a simple, straightforward delivery, one that minimized extraneous weight shifts and arm angles. Lincecum’s delivery, of course, is nearly the opposite, with lots of body movement, torquing, arm-flinging, and the like. He would understandably encounter difficulty replicating the same mechanics on every pitch.

And it’s his inability to replicate that’s likely the culprit. While he’s never been stingy in the bases-on-balls department (0.37 BB/IP over his career), this year Lincecum has walked an average of 0.51 batters per inning pitched.

The increase in walks illustrates the greater problem: Lincecum can’t spot his pitches. When Posey wants a fastball inside, Lincecum is likely to throw it high and wide. His splitter, which he uses as a changeup, works best when it starts over the heart of the plate then dips sharply, either to the right or left. This year, more often than not, that pitch starts at the hitter’s knees and winds up in the dirt, inducing few to swing.

The failure to locate has everything to do with mechanics gone wild. But can you imagine the challenge he and his pitching coach, Dave Righetti, have in dealing with each segment of Lincecum’s delivery? I’m sure that they’ve viewed countless videos of Lincecum’s Cy Young years in an effort to identify variations, which are probably quite subtle; yet each slight difference in each phase compounds.

Watching Lincecum for the first two or three innings last night I thought that he was hurrying his delivery. He wasn’t allowing his body weight and his left leg to shift backwards enough before thrusting forward. This pause prior to launch is crucial. The Mariners’ Jason Vargas discovered that he, too, was rushing his body. So he added a more pronounced delay, rotating his torso and right leg (he’s left-handed) further toward second base before propelling his body forward. This slight alteration adds a bit more velocity to his fastball and slightly more movement to his slider.

Many have studied Lincecum’s motion, developed by his father as a young boy. The curiosity stems from this question: How could someone so slight of build (about five feet eleven and 165 lbs.) throw a fastball nearly 100 mph., as he used to do. Here’s a breakdown of Lincecum’s delivery. You’ll note that Lincecum rotates his torso from his left to right to such a degree as to reveal almost his entire back to the batter. His left leg extends far behind the rubber. Then the pause before he explodes off the mound, landing his left foot far ahead, which provides leverage against the full unwinding of his torqued upper body.

For whatever reasons, Lincecum doesn’t throw the ball nearly as fast as he did during his miracle years, which attracted even Popular Mechanics to his motion. Could he throw that fast (say 98 mph) if he wanted to? I doubt it, since there have been many occasions this year when such a fastball could have extricated himself from a troubling situation; he could muster no more than 91 to 93.

When Linceum was throwing the ball in the high 90s he relied on a four-seam grip, which, at those speeds, makes the ball seem to “hop,” although gravity takes its toll; rather, the ball doesn’t drop as much as a pitch thrown with a two-seam grip. Now he still relies on the four-seam grip, to a lesser degree, to be sure. But that grip imparts little movement to the pitch. It’s “straight,” and hitters love straight.

So, let’s assume that Lincecum has lost his fastball. Can he still be effective? Of course. But he would have to exercise better command of his now-slower pitches. And this gets us back to what I believe to be the fundamental challenge: mechanics.

A pitcher who can deliver a ball in the high 90s, combined with a wicked splitter, doesn’t have to worry all that much about locating his pitches. That’s all changed, apparently. Now Lincecum has to resort to control, the ability to hit the target far more often than not.

If control emerges as critical to Lincecum’s future success, he’ll have to adopt different, less complicated mechanics. He is obviously aware of this need. Last year, during an especially mediocre, if not simply awful, stretch, he eschewed the windup in favor of the stretch position, even when no one was on base. The mechanics in throwing the ball from the stretch are necessarily less involved.

However, fooling around with mechanics during the season can be more problematic. Lincecum, like others in the Giants rotation, is paid big bucks to win games, not experiment on the fly. If Lincecum and Righetti determine that new mechanics are in order, the experimentation should be done either in the off-season or, gulp, in the minors. Can you imagine, though, sending a two-time Cy Young award winner back to the minors?

My guess, though, is that Lincecum will continue in the rotation for the rest of the year. And each time he starts, fingers are crossed.

Good luck with that, Tim.